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1 Introduction 
 
Madagascar, the fourth-largest island in the world with an area of about 590,000sq km, is 
located in the Indian Ocean approximately 400km east of the African mainland. It has been 
long-valued by natural scientists for its unique geology and natural history, and by social 
scientists for its sociocultural dynamism and its economic and demographic history 
associated with its location along Indian Ocean trade routes (Beaujard 2005). At the same 
time, Madagascar is among the least-developed countries in the world by a number of 
indicators, with one of the lowest gross domestic products (GDPs) in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Sarrasin 2006).  
 
In 2014, Madagascar ranked 155 out of 187 countries in the United Nations (UN) Human 
Development Report and the country failed to reach the majority of UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. In particular, the MDGs for child mortality, primary 
education enrolment and completion rates, and the eradication of extreme poverty were 
judged to be unachievable (World Bank 2015a). In 2014, about 65.5 per cent of the         
23.6 million people of Madagascar lived in rural areas, often with poor access to electricity, 
sanitation and telecommunications infrastructure, and in 2012 just over 75 per cent of the 
population depended primarily on agriculture. GDP growth was estimated at 3.4 per cent in 
2015, primarily driven by the extractive industry and the tertiary sector, yet over 80 per cent 
of the country’s population lived on less than US$1.90 per day (a rise from approximately   
74 per cent in 2005) (World Bank 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Despite a worsening development situation due to economic crisis and political unrest in 
recent years, the past decade has also seen an intensification of international interest in 
Madagascar’s natural resources. With donor support, Madagascar has gone ahead with 
long-term plans for the dramatic expansion of its protected area (PA) network; and 
multinational mining companies, often in cooperation with state ministries, state-owned 
companies and international financing institutions, have recently made the largest foreign 
investments in the country’s history (Corson 2012; Rajaobelina et al. 2010; Sarrasin 2006; 
US Department of State 2015; Wingen 2011). New extractive developments are established 
in rural areas, often near or contiguous to the boundaries and buffer zones of national parks 
and reserves. Further, they also frequently involve the creation of restrictive private 
conservation areas to offset environmentally destructive activities under ‘no net loss’ 
biodiversity directives. These recent trends mean that large-scale resource investments are 
unprecedented in their geographic extent and potential impacts on the Malagasy landscape 
and the livelihoods of rural people.  
 
Potential conflicts are related to many dynamic factors, including high, yet unsatisfied, social 
expectations at the mine site, unemployment and the transformative effects of large mining 
operations on formal and informal economies, that interact and unfold in historical 
sociopolitical context (Perks 2012). Furthermore, it is important to note that in these 
development contexts, conflicts over resources can be driven as much by relations internal 
to different stakeholder groups as between different groups (Gingembre 2015). It is well 
documented in a growing number of cases that local community members have had little 
voice in and have paid the greatest proportional economic and social costs, including both 
economic and physical displacement, of conservation and extractive development in 
Madagascar. It is unsurprising that rural Malagasy people are especially sensitive and 
resistant to directives and changes that are perceived as unjust, particularly those that 
prohibit diversified livelihood practices if close substitute practices that preserve economic 
and subsistence sufficiency, resilience and social salience are not available (Huff 2014; 
Wingen 2011). As investments in land and minerals have intensified in Madagascar’s rural 
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periphery, so has the frequency of conflicts around particular projects, some with national 
and international repercussions. 
 
As Ferguson and colleagues (2014) state, the growing interest in Madagascar’s natural 
resources has not occurred in a policy vacuum; since the 1980s, Madagascar has 
undergone sweeping policy reforms across sectors that have often suffered serious failings 
in terms of their operationalisation. This has had important consequences for Malagasy 
people, whose lands and livelihoods have been swept up in a massive resource rush, and 
holds profound implications for the future (op cit.: 63). This report is a policy analysis of 
international investments in Madagascar’s natural resources at the thematic intersection of 
extractive development, land reform, environmental preservation and conflict. After 
introducing the national and policy context, the report focuses on two recent mineral sands 
(locally known as fasymainty, or ‘black sands’ in southwestern Madagascar) development 
projects, the QMM (QIT Madagascar Minerals) Rio Tinto mining complex near Fort Dauphin 
in the southeast of the country and the Toliara Sands development north of the city of 
Toliara in southwestern Madagascar. This report uses analysis of these cases to identify 
factors at policy level that are implicated in the emergence and escalation of civil unrest and 
conflict in the context of joint resource development and environmental preservation projects 
in Madagascar. Both the QMM and Toliara Sands operations, which entail significant local 
environmental impacts in addition to social impacts, have sought to incorporate 
environmental offsetting into their operational plans. Additionally, both operations are 
associated with ongoing or emerging resistance movements and conflict episodes involving 
four primary stakeholder groups: government actors, foreign investors, environmentalists 
(including associated national and international environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs)), and local Malagasy communities impacted by mining activities.  
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2 Historical and policy context 
2.1 Pre-colonial and colonial history and independence 
Madagascar is a country of significant cultural and ecological diversity and dynamism due to 
its geology and natural history,1 its late permanent human settlement and an economic and 
demographic history associated with its location along historical Indian Ocean trade routes 
(Beaujard 2005; Dewar and Wright 1993; Southall 1971). Contemporary Malagasy culture, 
language, and genetics reflect African, Arab, Indonesian, East Asian, South Asian and 
European influences (Burney et al. 2004; Dewar and Wright 1993; Razafindrazaka et al. 
2010). 
 
In the pre-colonial period, Madagascar was home to many indigenous kingdoms reflecting a 
diverse range of political forms, the ruling dynasties of which became empowered between 
the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries (Cole and Middleton 2001; Kent 1970). One of these 
powerful dynasties, that of the Merina of the central highlands in what is currently 
Antananarivo Province, went on to head a powerful pre-colonial oligarchy with the support of 
English allies (Berg 1981, 1985). The pre-colonial Merina state ruled conquered portions of 
the island from about 1810 until 1896 when Madagascar came under French colonial rule. 
The French colonial administration established a ‘classic, dominant and dependent colonial 
economy’ and formally established a number of economically specialised regions (Cole and 
Middleton 2001: 7). Through the structure of indirect rule, by which local elites served as 
appointed agents of the colonial administration and loyal Malagasy partisans and military 
were empowered to enforce settlement laws, conscript labour and collect taxes locally, the 
French administration penetrated, at least bureaucratically and symbolically, even the most 
rural regions of Madagascar (Yount, Tsiazonera and Tucker 2001).  
 
In 1960, Madagascar gained its independence and became recognised as a sovereign state, 
the First Malagasy Republic, although it retained strong economic ties with France until the 
1970s. In 1972, Didier Ratsiraka’s election to the presidency ushered in the Second 
Republic, a period of Soviet-aligned state socialism characterised by economic isolationism, 
nationalisation of natural resources and industries, and economic decline punctuated by 
periods of political instability (Cole 1998; Sodikoff 2007).  
2.2 Liberalisation and the redefinition of the Malagasy state 
By the 1980s, Madagascar’s economic deterioration was internationally perceived as a 
severe crisis, and a new period of liberalisation was ushered in as foreign investment in 
resources and industry was encouraged and Madagascar’s General Development Policy 
was developed with support from the World Bank. The General Development Policy involved 
three primary goals: alleviation of poverty, restoring internal and external fiscal balance, and 
finding a better regional balance. Based on a development model in which increases in 
exports are assumed to alleviate poverty whilst preserving biodiversity, these goals were to 
be achieved through the implementation of a policy ‘tripod’ involving mutually reinforcing 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the Environmental Action Plan (EAP) and the 
Program of Social Action and Support for Public Management (PASAGE), a social stop-gap 
                                                        
1 Madagascar has been geologically isolated from the African mainland for the past 75–100 million years. This has resulted in 
significant ecological uniqueness and a high incidence of endemic plant, animal and bird species and unique habitats. 
Consequently, Madagascar has been named one of the ‘hottest of the Earth’s biodiversity hotspots’ (Ganzhorn et al. 2001; 
Hannah et al. 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Norris 2006) and has become a geographic focus for externally funded biodiversity 
conservation.  
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programme meant to ease the negative impacts of privatisation and decentralisation 
(Campbell 2010; Leonard 1989; Sarrasin 2006). 
 
The crux of the reforms was the redefinition of the Malagasy state to facilitate its shift away 
from regulation and production. Creating the ‘right’ policy environment for investment 
involved mechanisms of privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation affecting state 
withdrawal from most productive activities, deregulation of the exchange rate and prices, 
liberalisation of domestic trade and imports, and decentralisation of public affairs decision-
making and management to the commune level (Republic of Madagascar 2003; Sarrasin 
2006). Aside from contractual agreements with the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund that are outlined at length in documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(Republic of Madagascar 2003), these mechanisms were formalised in a series of legislative 
reforms at the national level, including most importantly what became the National 
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), the Malagasy Mining Code, and the National Land 
Tenure Programme.  
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3  Environmental policy reform 
 
Although the national economy continued to deteriorate between the early 1980s and 2000s, 
national political emphasis on biodiversity preservation has remained a national focal point 
of policy. In 1991, the Government of Madagascar launched Africa’s first NEAP, the most 
ambitious and comprehensive environmental programme in Africa to date comprising a long-
term investment programme planned in three phases. The NEAP has been the primary 
vehicle for channelling support to the management of PAs, other forest areas, wetlands and 
coral reefs in Madagascar (Keck 2001; Razafindralambo and Gaylord 2006). The inception 
of ‘the NEAP era’ in Madagascar led a new wave of liberal reforms and a marked shift in the 
locus of policy production and governance from the centralised Malagasy state to complex 
de-territorialised networks of NGOs, private companies, donors, and international financial 
institutions in collaboration with an increasingly fragmented and decentralised government 
(Duffy 2006; Raik, Wilson and Decker 2008). The NEAP era saw the creation of a new 
environmental management structure and implementing agencies under the Ministry of the 
Environment, including l’Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées 
(ANGAP), a quasi-private agency (essentially a private organisation managing a public 
utility) created to manage the growing PA network (Giminez 2012; Keck 2001). These shifts 
were accompanied by the rhetoric of democratisation, liberalisation, poverty alleviation and 
national economic development and an emphasis on the necessity of the interdependence 
of development goals and environmental preservation (Duffy 2006; Freudenberger 2010).  
 
In the Malagasy context, goals of ‘environmental preservation’ are most often articulated in 
terms of the conservation of biodiversity and halting deforestation. The primary means of 
accomplishing these goals in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been to gradually 
increase the amount of terrestrial (and recently marine) territory under formal protection by 
establishing PAs of various types (Wingen 2011).  
 
The first Malagasy protected areas were established under colonial authority in the 1920s, 
and by 1990, Malagasy PAs covered approximately 1.3 million hectares. In 2003, President 
Marc Ravalomanana articulated his famous ‘Durban Vision’, a pledge to triple protected 
areas from 1.7 million hectares, or about 3 per cent of national territory, to 6 million hectares, 
or 10 per cent of the national territory, as recommended by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), by 2012 (Durbin et al. 2006; Sarrasin 2006; Scales 2014; 
USAID 2010). However, the realisation of this plan was delayed (but not halted) by the 
national political crisis of the late 2000s and Madagascar’s economic situation has worsened 
in recent years.  
 
Since the nineteenth century, many Malagasy environmental laws sought to exclude people 
from using forest resources outright, but in 1996 the first law promoting the management 
transfer of renewable natural resources to local communities (Gestion Locale Sécurisée, or 
GELOSE) was passed, and between 2002 and 2009, environmental laws in Madagascar 
saw further shifts in language from exclusionary policies regarding local people’s use of 
natural resources to those promoting local consultation processes and the creation of 
contracts for sustainable natural resource use following principles of Community Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and co-management (Keck 2001; Wingen 2011).  
 
Alongside this turn, in 2006, the governance structure of Malagasy PAs was reorganised 
once again into the Système d’Aires Protégées de Madagascar (SAPM), a change that 
simplified the legal PA establishment process and allowed PAs to be managed by a number 
of entities, including quasi-state agencies, NGOs, community organisations, private sector 
organisations, or a combination of these through collaborative management agreements 
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(Durbin et al. 2006). While some claim that these changes reflect a shift to a more ‘people-
centred’ and democratic approach to conservation, they follow trends in decentralisation and 
privatisation and respond pragmatically to funding constraints and poor capacity of the 
NEAP organisations to manage PAs and enforce environmental rules. And the central 
missions of Malagasy PAs are quite similar – to limit the ‘destructive’ use of natural 
resources by poor Malagasy people living in or near forested areas, and especially to 
decrease rates of forest cutting and burning associated with traditional rice and maize 
cultivation practices (tavy; hatsake). According to Raik (2007), ‘despite the rhetoric of local 
empowerment… governance arrangements are substantially controlled’ by non-local 
stakeholders, consultation processes, when carried out, tend to favour the interests of 
private interests and local elites, and governance arrangements are quite variable. 
Significant gaps remain between policy discourse, legislation and local-scale conservation 
practice. 
 
In this context, the increasing number of Malagasy PAs have become sites of local, national 
and international interest, ‘transnational’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) locales where powerful 
environmental and development discourses, as well as the livelihoods and material struggles 
of the Malagasy population, meet. This is because almost three-quarters of all Malagasy 
people derive primary support (in terms of subsistence and/or market income) from 
agriculture, growing rice, maize, manioc, pulses and vegetables and rearing livestock 
(especially cattle) for home consumption, for sale in domestic markets, and for export 
(Dorosh and Haggblade 1993; Minten and Barrett 2007). Yet, in the rush to create new 
conservation areas, which frequently result in economic and physical displacement of 
smallholders, local development needs have often been ignored and there have been 
reports of land grabs in areas likely to be designated as protected areas (USAID 2010). 
 
It is in this context that both land reform and mining reform have unfolded in roughly the last 
20 years.  
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4  Land reform in Madagascar 
4.1 A brief history of land policy in Madagascar 
Local tenure systems and formal land laws precede the colonial period in Madagascar. Prior 
to French colonisation, land tenure was governed under a number of customary systems 
that varied considerably across the island, and in 1881 the Merina Royal Council established 
a code under which all land under control of the Merina state was de facto property of the 
state (Leisz 1996). In 1897, the French colonial authorities introduced a land privatisation 
scheme and formal registration system based on the Australian Torrens Act to encourage 
European settlement, to provide an internationally recognised legal basis for French 
appropriation of Malagasy land and to foster land ‘modernisation’ through the development 
of agribusiness. The colonial system was subsequently revised through decree to undermine 
the legal status of customary land tenure and strengthen state control of land (Leisz 1996: 
3). 
 
The colonial land policy remained in place through independence until the reform process of 
the late twentieth century, despite the fact that under this system the land registration 
process was so bureaucratically complex, time intensive, mismanaged and expensive that it 
was, for practical purposes, inaccessible (Leisz 1996; Teyssier et al. 2009; USAID 2010). 
Prior to reform, the most significant aspect of Malagasy land law was the principe de 
domanité, the policy under which all untitled lands were presumed to belong to the state.  
 
However, significant gaps existed between national law and land governance practices at 
the local level. Even though the principe de domanité legally prevailed under the Torrens 
system, most rural land users in Madagascar secured rights of access and control of land 
through customary tenure systems, which often went unchallenged by the state due to poor 
enforcement capacity in most of the rural parts of the country. In areas where the 
government was able to enforce land tenure regulations, people responded to the situation 
of ‘overlapping tenure systems’ in a number of ways, including developing hybrid or plural 
systems that functionally reconciled customary and state systems (e.g. petites papiers 
systems), and through resistance to state enforcement (Leisz 1996). 
4.2 Madagascar’s National Land Programme and local land 
users’ tenure security 
Reformulating Madagascar’s land policy was an important part of liberal reform 
recommendations for Madagascar, and the reform process was premised on the 
assumptions that tenure insecurity was a widespread problem and that rights formalisation 
would reduce conflicts and boost local economies through credit, investment and the 
establishment of local land markets (Burnod et al. 2012; Minten and Barrett 2007). Further, 
land reform, and particularly private ownership of land, was viewed as a necessary step 
toward simplifying procedures for land access through long-term land leases and toward 
improving security of access for foreign investors (Republic of Madagascar 2003; World 
Bank 1999).  
 
The first attempt to implement procedures for formal recognition of customary property rights 
came with Decree No. 98-610 of 13 August 1998, which regulated the implementation of 
relative land tenure security. This law was meant for local communities to whom the state 
had transferred management of natural resources through the 1996 GELOSE reforms that 
regulated the devolution of renewable natural resource management. Even though this was 
a step toward a formal recognition of customary resource rights, implementation was weak 
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and the law contained no provisions or tenure security for individuals with customary claims 
(Ferguson et al. 2014). 
 
In 2005, Madagascar launched an ongoing programme of land reform with the National Land 
Program (Programme National Foncier, or PNF), which included laws to decentralise land 
management, establish a computerised land registry, simplify the land registration process, 
merge Madagascar’s formal and customary land tenure systems and dismantle the principe 
de domanité (Burnod et al. 2012). Local land registry offices (guichets fonciers) were 
established at the commune level to issue individual or collective land certificates (certificats 
fonciers) at low economic and opportunity cost to smallholders who could demonstrate 
ongoing occupation or use of a tract of land (ibid.). Under the new policy, the state only owns 
land registered in the name of public actors and ‘unoccupied land’ (Andrianirina 
Ratsialonana et al. 2011). Occupied but unregistered land is no longer considered to be 
state property, but rather ‘untitled private property’ that has legal status if occupied or used 
and can be certified at the district level through local land offices. The new legislation does 
not govern forestland, protected areas and land with natural resources subject to special 
legislation, mineral and hydrocarbon (sub-surface) rights or land set aside for planned 
investment zones (USAID 2010). 
4.3 Land reform, large-scale investments and political crisis 
As discussed above, land reforms initiated in the mid-2000s challenged de facto state 
ownership of land and legally recognised individual and collective land rights, including 
usufruct rights and those based on customary claims, and devolved authority over land 
registration to the commune level. But the other side of the Malagasy land reform coin, that 
which aims to foster large-scale international investment in Madagascar’s natural resources, 
is governed much more centrally, by different legislation and institutions, and can in practice 
undermine local resource access, property rights and tenure security.  
 
In addition to sector-specific legislation, investors’ competition for Madagascar’s land falls 
within three basic bodies of national law: the land laws (discussed above), the Decree to 
Make Investments Compatible with the Environment (Mise en Compatibilité des 
Investissements avec l’Environnement, or MECIE)2 and the Law on Investments3 
(Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011). The relevance of the 2005 Land Law is the 
assumption of private, rather than state, ownership of land, as well as the devolution of 
authority over land registration to the commune level. The MECIE Decree is an 
environmental mainstreaming mechanism, requiring large investments that entail potential 
environmental impacts to undergo a scoping process and prepare a social and 
environmental assessment and remediation plan if applicable. Foreign investments that 
involve land acquisitions are governed for the most part under the Law on Investments.  
  
Traditionally, foreign companies and individuals have not been permitted to purchase land in 
Madagascar regardless of the size of their investment. However, under the Law on 
Investments passed in 2004 and revised in 2008, foreign land ownership of 2.5 hectares 
was permitted, conditional upon a US$500,000 investment in Madagascar’s real estate, 
banking, insurance or tourism industries (USAID 2010). The 2008 revision of the investment 
law states that, while foreign natural or legal entities cannot directly have land access 
through title deed, they may access land through perpetual lease with a maximum length of 
18–99 years if authorised (authorisation allows parties to carry out the necessary legal 
formalities for property acquisition) by the Economic Development Board of Madagascar 
(EDBM), a body created under the Madagascar Investment Law as a ‘one stop shop’ to 
facilitate the approval of investment projects. Further, companies operating under Malagasy 
                                                        
2 Decree No. 99-954 of 15 December 1999, Amended with Decree No. 2004-167. 
3 Law No. 2003-028 of 22 August 2003, extended by law 2007-036 of 14 January 2008. 
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law that are controlled by foreigners have full access to purchase land provided 
authorisation is granted by the EDBM, even though leases remain the preferred option 
(Republic of Madagascar 2008).  
 
For eligible investors, with EDBM authorisation, the lease or purchase of land can be 
negotiated with a number of parties, depending on the legal status of the land in question. In 
the case of land privately owned by individuals, access can be negotiated with individual 
landowners who possess title or certificate. In the case of state-owned public or private land 
or unoccupied land, access can be negotiated with the state. In order to access areas of less 
than 50 hectares, applications for lease or purchase must be made to the regional State-
Owned Land Administration (SOLA) office. Above 50 hectares, application must pass 
through the central SOLA office and become the responsibility of the Minister in charge of 
land administration in the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and Decentralization 
(Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011).   
 
Popular resistance to land deals is common, and can have wide-ranging repercussions, as 
demonstrated in the context of widely publicised association between ‘back room’ large-
scale land deals and the inception of the 2009 Malagasy political crisis. In addition to being 
affected by global economic crises in the late 2000s, prolonged national-level political 
tensions came to a head and international attention in Autumn 2008 when it was revealed 
that South Korean company Daewoo Logistics was negotiating with the Malagasy 
government for the transfer through lease of 1.3m hectares of arable land in four coastal 
regions of the country. The Daewoo acquisitions, as well as the less publicised but 
concurrent 200,000-hectare deal with Indian agribusiness Verun, ultimately failed. Had 
negotiations succeeded, these export-oriented agribusiness projects would have been highly 
unfavourable to local populations and indeed led to accusations that President Marc 
Ravalomanana was selling off Madagascar’s natural heritage and food production capacity 
to foreign investors (Burnod et al. 2011). In March of 2009, Ravalomanana was ousted from 
office in the context of mass protests by opponents led by Andry Rajoelina, who installed 
himself as leader of a new government, named the High Transitional Authority (HAT). As 
stated by Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI 2014), Ravalomanana’s ousting 
was military-driven and normatively ‘reprehensible’, but the widespread popular discontent 
with the Ravalomanana government reflected genuine structural concerns. Popular 
resistance coalesced particularly around the government’s approach to land tenure, 
extractive resources, contracting, and private sector relationships, while even donors had 
begun to ask questions about transparency and accountability (BTI 2014). 
 
Despite what have been characterised as imperialist tendencies of the Ravalomanana 
government, most of the international community considered the transfer of power a coup 
d’état against a democratically elected president, did not recognise the HAT as legitimate 
and withdrew crucial international support from the country (Freudenberger 2010). Although 
Madagascar saw the restoration of democratic elections in 2013, the prolonged crisis left the 
Malagasy economy ‘in tatters’ as many companies pulled out of the country, tourism 
revenues fell and the government was nearly bankrupted (USAID 2010). What this meant for 
the majority of Malagasy people was increasing economic, nutritional and interpersonal 
insecurities that were exacerbated, particularly in the rural south of the country, by prolonged 
drought and increasing incidence of corruption, violent crime and property theft. While the 
Malagasy political crisis somewhat slowed the momentum of the agribusiness land grab in 
Madagascar, the HAT continued to grant mining contracts, with significant implications for 
land users, to foreign investors (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011).   
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5 Mining in Madagascar 
 
Although Madagascar is a negligible consumer of mineral resources, it has played a 
significant role in the world’s production of ilmenite, rutile and zirconium, and other minerals 
(Yager 2014). Major mineral deposits are scattered throughout the country, including those 
that contain industrial ores (e.g. graphite, chromite, quartz, mica, iron, nickel and ilmenite), 
decorative and semi-precious stones (e.g. beryl, labradorite, rock crystal, rhodonite, marble, 
cordierite, quartz, tourmaline and corundum), precious stones (e.g. ruby, sapphire, emerald 
and aquamarine) and gold (Sarrasin 2006). 
5.1 Madagascar’s mining sector reform in African context  
Prior to mining sector reforms that have been implemented across the continent in the past 
25 years, African states (including Madagascar) were in large part the owners and operators 
of their respective national mining companies, with state agents fulfilling roles in regard to 
managing community expectations and claims, social services delivery and environmental 
impacts at the level of the mine site. The wide-scale reform of African mining regimes since 
the early 1990s is part of a longer trend in the liberalisation of the mining sector globally. Led 
by Bretton Woods institutions, and particularly the World Bank, liberalisation of mining and 
other sectors has been brought about through ‘the retrenchment of state authority’, a 
redefining of the role of the state to facilitate its withdrawal from productive activities through 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, including in the minerals sector, in the name of 
reducing ‘fiscal deficit’ (Campbell 2010). As a result, as is the story across sectors, the 
state’s role vis-à-vis mining has been transformed from primary operator of extractive 
activities into primary facilitator and monitor of foreign investments in extractive resources 
(Perks 2012: 253). This process has also engendered a transfer of social and environmental 
responsibility from a centralised regulatory state to foreign mining companies and, in some 
instances, public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Perks 2012). 
5.2 Summary of Mining Code reform: 1999–2015 
By the 1990s, SAPs had already instituted privatisation of national industries, eliminated 
direct state intervention by restricting the activities of the Office of National Mines and 
Strategic Industries (OMNIS), and had introduced competition through enforcement of the 
existing mining codes4 (Sarrasin 2006, 2009). However, according to the World Bank, before 
the mining reform process of the late 1990s, most mining activities were small- to medium-
scale artisanal operations with a low overall impact on the economy. Due to corruption, 
problems with the legal framework, lack of transparency and poor managerial capacity, 
national-level institutions were not equipped to deal with large-scale mining investments. 
Procedures for granting mineral rights and investors’ concession tenure security were 
particularly affected, which kept investments for exploration low (Girones, Pugachevsky and 
Walser 2009: 58). Prior to the passing of the Mining Code in 1999, further major hindrances 
to the growth of the mining industry in Madagascar included a lack of basic geological data 
and reliable information on mineral production, a lack of human and material resources to 
support the growth of the industry, poor transportation infrastructure, poor sectoral 
performance in relation to GDP growth, high taxation and a lack of mechanisms for 
enforcement of new environmental regulations (Sarrasin 2006: 393).  
 
The primary goals of the 1999 reforms, driven by the World Bank’s Private Sector 
Development and Capacity Building Project (PATESP), were to link mining laws to 
                                                        
4 Law of 31 July 1896, Government Orders No. 60-090 of 5 September 1960 and No. 62-103 of 1 October 1962, and Law No. 
90-017 of 20 July 1990, followed by No. 95-016 of 9 August 1995 (Sarrasin 2006: 393). 
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environmental concerns, to facilitate investment and increase the mining industry’s 
contribution to national economic growth (along the lines of the World Bank’s prevailing anti-
poverty strategy), to integrate small-scale and artisanal mining activities into the formal 
economy, and to facilitate the withdrawal of the state from productive mining activities, from 
participation in the capital of mining companies and from other activities that would bring the 
state’s ‘neutrality’ into question (Sarrasin 2006; World Bank 2003). The Law on Large-Scale 
Mining Investments passed in 2001 established a special regime to encourage large-scale 
mining investment.5 Since 2005, this framework has been amended to lower the threshold 
for eligibility for perks from US$100m to US$25m6 to further facilitate investments. This 
framework further gives the right to a series of tax, royalty, legal and customs incentives 
applicable throughout the term of the mining permit (US Department of State 2015; WTO 
2008). 
 
Implementation of reforms saw the reorganisation of public mining sector administration, the 
establishment of regional and central Offices of the Mining Cadastre (Bureau du Cadastre 
Minier de Madagascar, or BCMM) an autonomous agency under the direct administration of 
the national Ministry Near the President in Charge of Mines and Petroleum (Ministère auprès 
de la Présidence chargé des Mines et du Pétrole, or MPMP, which was prior to 2015 the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines), development of a computer-based Mining Cadastre and 
Registry System (ostensibly open to public consultation) to speed concession application 
and registration procedures, the implementation of a computerised environmental 
management unit and the institution of fiscal benefits for investors as laid out in the 2001 
Law on Large-Scale Mining Investments (Ffooks and Glass 2015; Girones et al. 2009; World 
Bank 2003).  
 
Mining operators could now acquire licences to sub-surface mineral rights on a ‘first come 
first served’ basis through application to a BCMM, and negotiation of surface rights with 
individual local landowners at the site level are considered the responsibility of the operator 
(Global Investment and Business Center 2013; Republic of Madagascar 2002). As with land 
investments discussed in Section 4.3, investors must obtain EDBM authorisation, and then 
the lease or purchase of surface rights can be negotiated. The inter-ministerial MECIE 
Decree of 1999 further requires operators to obtain environmental authorisation under the 
Ministry of the Environment prior to beginning research or mining operations.  
5.3 Legal pluralism in the governance of mining in Madagascar 
Although the legal framework governing mining activities flows from the Mining Code and 
associated legislation, mining activities in Madagascar are in fact pluralistically governed – 
shaped and regulated by a number of additional directives, rules, guidelines and even relict 
practices. In some instances, despite the push toward privatisation of the mining industry 
brought about by SAPs, pre-reform state institutions can be involved in the capital of mining 
companies; for example, QMM is a Malagasy mining company that, since the 1980s, has 
been jointly owned by Madagascar’s OMNIS, which controls 20 per cent of the company, 
and a Canadian subsidiary of UK-based Rio Tinto, which controls 80 per cent of the 
company (Rio Tinto 2015). In other instances, these are inter-ministerial decrees like the 
MECIE Decree discussed above that is meant to mainstream environmental responsibility in 
development projects across sectors.  
 
Other sources of pluralism in mining governance come from the institutional directives of 
different international donor and regulatory groups. For example, the MECIE Decree 
requires the production of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) before EDBM 
authorisation and mining licences can be granted, but does not offer specific guidelines for 
                                                        
5 Law No. 20-2001 of 8 October 2001 and Implementing Decree No. 2003-784. 
6 Law No. 2005-022 of 27 July 2005. 
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environmental protection or social risk management. Because of this, the Toliara Sands 
operation in southwestern Madagascar opted to adopt the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) guidance notes on biodiversity based on Performance Standard 6 and a model for a 
social and environmental management system based on Performance Standard 1 
(Bezuidenhout 2013; IFC 2012). Similarly, Malagasy law allows, but does not mandate, that 
environmentally destructive mining operations establish biodiversity offsetting programmes. 
However, biodiversity offsetting is required for Madagascar’s inclusion in the Extractive 
Industry Trade Initiative (EITI) and has been adopted by operators across the country, 
including World Titanium Resources, Ambatovy, QMM, Wisco, Guanomad, Exxonmobil and 
others (USAID 2014). In other instances, mining activities are affected by national-level laws 
governing activities in other sectors, particularly when a project is at the intersection of 
different ministerial jurisdictions through linkages to the governance of land, water, 
infrastructure development, forest and marine conservation activities.  
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6 Case studies: the mining–conservation–
conflict nexus 
 
The restructuring of the Malagasy state in relation to economic production since the 1980s 
and neoliberal reform processes since the 1990s has transformed resource governance at 
the margins. Tensions between customary resource management systems and a centralised 
but ‘distant’ state bureaucracy have been complicated further by the diffusion of power to 
national and international NGOs, private companies, and other institutions in collaboration 
with an increasingly fragmented yet nonetheless essential state. Even though ‘communities’ 
have ostensibly been empowered through policy reform as well, it is rare for rural 
communities to withhold consent during the consultation process, and disagreements and 
conflicts tend to emerge in reaction to, rather than in anticipation of, land dispossession. This 
may be due to high initial expectations of economic opportunities and wealth transfer on the 
part of local leaders, but is also surely related to a lack of access to economic and 
institutional alternatives, political pressure and fears of retaliation by those in more powerful 
positions, and misconceptions about the legal framework and local people’s rights in the 
face of the law (Ferguson et al. 2014; Gingembre 2015: 562). 
 
In the two cases discussed in this section, we explore how the changing policy environment 
in Madagascar has interacted with contextual factors to produce unique contestations and 
conflict dynamics in two settings in rural southern Madagascar. The QMM operation in 
southeastern Madagascar and the more recently operating Ranobe mine, part of a larger set 
of concessions in southwestern Madagascar known as Toliara Sands, are both mineral 
sands operations that have become important sites of contestation and conflict that have 
galvanised new social movements around local rights, environmental justice and the 
distribution of benefits of extractive development. Because of historical social, institutional 
and legal trends in Madagascar, outlined in the first sections of this report, local mine 
projects have become important sites for research aimed at clarifying our understanding of 
relationships between cross-sectoral policy reform, the reconfiguration of the roles of the 
state, the private sector and communities, and emerging forms of conflict at the nexus of 
extractive development, land tenure and environmental preservation.  
6.1 QMM Rio Tinto, Fort Dauphin, southeastern Madagascar 
QIT Madagascar Minerals (QMM) is a mineral sands project based near the town of Fort 
Dauphin (Tolagnaro) in southeastern Madagascar. Since the 1980s, QMM has been a jointly 
owned company as part of a PPP between Madagascar’s OMNIS, which controls 20 per 
cent of the company, and QIT Fer et Titane, a Canadian subsidiary of Rio Tinto7 that 
controls 80 per cent of the company (Rio Tinto 2015). The QMM project uses active dredge 
mining to extract a titanium dioxide ore that is exported and refined into a white pigment 
used to colour a variety of consumer goods, from paint to toothpaste, and is the largest 
development project in Madagascar (Rio Tinto 2015). The three mine sites involved in the 
project are set to be mined sequentially under a long-term land lease from the Malagasy 
government (Gerety 2009; Rio Tinto 2014; Seagle 2009, 2012, 2013). 
 
Starting in 1986, QMM conducted an extensive exploration programme along the eastern 
coast of Madagascar searching for heavy mineral sands, which are a source of titanium 
dioxide in the form of ilmenite and rutile. These investigations led to the discovery of what 
was deemed a viable ore deposit in the Anosy region of Madagascar near Fort Dauphin,      
                                                        
7 Rio Tinto is a UK-based British–Australian multinational mining company, and is one of the largest mining companies in the 
world. 
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a town also known locally as Tolagnaro. These deposits, identified at the sites of Mandena, 
Sainte Luce, and Petriky, are located in one of the poorest and most underdeveloped parts 
of Madagascar; most of the residents of Anosy are members of farming families dependent 
on land and forest resources for subsistence and market income and an estimated 82 per 
cent of people living in the region make less than the equivalent of US$1 per day. The 
deposits are also located in an ecologically sensitive area, underneath some of the last 
remnant littoral forest in southeastern Madagascar in one of the most ecologically diverse 
areas of the country (Vincelette, Dean and Ganzhorn 2007: 1).  
 
Following about 20 years of research and exploration, an Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) was completed in 2001, and QMM received legal licence for operations 
in 2005, when the Malagasy government also agreed to contribute US$35m to the 
development of infrastructure. This funding came from a World Bank ‘Integrated Growth 
Poles’ project aimed at strengthening finance, export capacity and private sector 
development. In this particular case, the contribution was earmarked to fund the renovation 
of the Ehoala Port and urban infrastructure of Fort Dauphin to facilitate QMM’s export 
(Seagle 2013).  
 
At the IUCN World Conservation Congress in Bangkok in 2004, representatives of Rio Tinto 
announced that it ‘aims to have a net positive impact (NPI) on biodiversity by minimising the 
negative impacts of its activities and by making appropriate contributions to conservation in 
the regions in which it operates’ (Turner 2014). This is the central idea behind Rio Tinto’s 
subsequent global ‘no net loss’/‘net positive impact’, or NPI, approach, in which the company 
applies a number of tools and methods, including spatial strategies of voluntary biodiversity 
offsetting bundled with carbon and ecosystem services accounting and trading, with 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) as compensatory finance mechanism, to fund 
conservation activities outside of active mining zones (Anstee 2008; WBCSD 2015). 
 
This strategy, which has been previously piloted by the company in the context of the 
Dampier Salt operations in Western Australia and in the context of copper mining in 
Mongolia, links place-based extractive and conservation activities to both international 
voluntary markets and a variety of international voluntary and compliance-based finance 
mechanisms and market-like instruments, which vary depending on the national policy 
contexts of particular mining projects (Turner 2014). While the QMM project is described by 
company literature as a third ‘pilot project’ for the NPI approach, the company has 
experience outside the NPI with environmental impact mitigation activities in diverse 
contexts, from conservation banking in the US to linkage with the national REDD+ strategy 
in Guinea (Anstee 2008; Rio Tinto 2014).  
 
The QMM project began in 2005 with infrastructure development and the leasing, and 
relocation of local Malagasy residents from, approximately 6,000 hectares of territory. Active 
extraction at the first site, Mandena, began in 2009, and mine managers contend that, at 
peak capacity, it could produce as much as two million tonnes of ilmenite (worth about 
US$100 per tonne for unrefined ore) per year to be exported for processing abroad (Seagle 
2013). Of the full 6,000-hectare project concession, the Mandena portion of the project 
comprised approximately 2,000 hectares, and 230 hectares of this were set aside for the 
Mandena biodiversity conservation area, which is advertised as a ‘biodiversity gene bank’ for 
future restoration activities (under the NPI strategy) in the area and is further promoted by 
QMM as a destination for ecotourism (Seagle 2009).   
 
In addition to the support of the World Bank and the partnership between Rio Tinto and the 
Malagasy government, a number of international environmental and development 
organisations support Rio Tinto’s NPI approach in Madagascar. The IUCN entered a formal 
partnership with Rio Tinto in 2010 after nearly ten years of less formal cooperation. Other 
partners include organisations such as Bird Life International, the Wildlife Conservation 
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Society (WCS), Conservation International (CI), Kew Botanical Gardens and USAID. Rio 
Tinto’s partner organisations praise the company’s scientific approach to biodiversity 
offsetting and portray the company as an ethical, ‘model’ mining company that goes above 
and beyond legal requirements for addressing social and environmental issues (Seagle 
2009 :15).  
 
The QMM project has long been fraught with controversy on a number of grounds. On the 
international field, the NPI biodiversity offsetting strategy is considered by a number of 
international environmental groups to be something of an environmental shell game, an 
attempt to ‘greenwash’ inherently ‘brown’ industrial activities and resource grabbing. On a 
local level, labour conflicts have occurred, and there have been substantial and ongoing 
incidents between mine operators and members of local communities that have been 
dramatically affected by the project. Many among the affected populations are the poorest of 
the poor and are dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods in an absolute sense, 
and compensation for resources lost is widely considered unfair in the local area and is far 
below World Bank regulations (Seagle 2013). According to Seagle (2013), some Malagasy 
refer to the QMM mine as, ‘mivarotra tanindrazana – “selling off the land of the ancestors” – 
a proverb which emerged during the French colonial era and is linked to historical 
experiences of dispossession’ (Seagle 2013: 7).  
 
Protests and general strikes have occurred around the QMM project site since mining 
activities began in 2009, with hundreds of Malagasy people from around the region striking 
against loss of forest access, involuntary relocation, unfair compensation for lost lands and 
livelihoods, the destruction of sacred forests and removal of ancestral tombs, and widely 
perceived unfairness in QMM’s practice of importing mine workers from other countries and 
regions rather than training and hiring local people (as had been promised during 
consultations) to work on projects. A particularly large protest occurred in January 2013, in 
which hundreds of lightly armed protestors, many of whom had experienced eviction from 
lands now controlled by the mines, blocked roads and trapped employees (including the 
chief of Malagasy operations) in a mining site. After the company threatened to withdraw 
from all operations in Madagascar, the protest was put down through government military 
force (Seagle 2013). Some members of affected local populations, with assistance from 
international advocacy groups, took QMM to court over the issue of inequitable 
compensation for land, but the case was dismissed in 2013 (The Telegraph 2013). Despite 
public information campaigns on the part of QMM in an attempt to improve relations on the 
ground, these ongoing conflicts and controversies have resulted in a partial scaling-back of 
QMM’s project activities and plans for expansion of mining activities past the first site were 
scaled back, at least temporarily, in 2014.  
6.2 Ranobe mine, Toliara Sands, southwestern Madagascar 
Compared to QMM, the Toliara Sands project is a more recent mineral sands development 
and does not involve co-ownership by OMNIS or any other government agency. It is located 
in the Atsimo-Andrefana region in coastal southwestern Madagascar, in an underdeveloped 
and extremely poor agricultural region north of the provincial capital and port city of Toliara. 
Toliara Sands is wholly owned by Australian mining company World Titanium Resources Ltd 
through its Madagascar-based subsidiary, Exploitation Madagascar SARL, and includes one 
licensed mining property, Ranobe, and three further exploration sites at Ankililoaka, 
Basibasy and Morombe8 (Ranscome 2015). Unlike QMM, which is part of a global network 
of extractive operations operated by Rio Tinto and subsidiaries, Madagascar Resources NL, 
later World Titanium Resources, was established with the expressed purpose to explore 
mineral sands in southwestern Madagascar (Ranscome 2015: 18). The Ranobe mine is 
                                                        
8 The three exploration sites have been previously licensed to World Titanium Resources Ltd and are currently due for renewal. 
However, granting of new permits and licences has been suspended pending mining reforms slated for early 2016.  
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considered the flagship of the Toliara Sands development, and is projected to produce over 
407,000 tonnes of ilmenite and 44,000 tonnes of zircon-rich concentrate through dry mining 
and on-site processing per year through an estimated initial 21-year mine life (WTR 2016). 
 
Initial exploration and feasibility studies of all four sites have been carried out since 1999 
through various joint and co-funding ventures with other mining companies, and these 
activities identified a number of promising deposits in the region. In the late 2000s, an ESIA 
was prepared and submitted to the Office National pour l’Environnement (ONE) and in 2012, 
legal mining licences and water rights were granted for the Ranobe operation (Bezuidenhout 
2013). Development of the mine has been delayed by funding shortfalls as a number of 
partners have joined and subsequently withdrawn from operations over the years. Since the 
initial mining permit was granted, the project has been modified in order to cut costs and a 
new ESIA, based on Malagasy law and IFC guidance notes on biodiversity and for social 
and environmental management, was prepared and submitted to ONE in 2014, and 
operations went forward on a limited basis that year (Bezuidenhout 2013; IFC 2012; WTR 
2014).  
 
The Ranobe operators propose a dry mining process, environmental remediation following 
the completion of mining operations, and biodiversity and carbon offsetting to mitigate 
environmental damage for the duration of the project. In terms of production, on-site ore 
concentration and overland transport to port is a more cost-effective means of extraction 
than dredge mining. In the course of the proposed production process, dry mining at Ranobe 
produces ore through mechanised sand displacement (truck and front-loader), which is then 
mixed with water into a slurry and pumped to an on-site concentrator (primary concentrator 
plant, or PCP). After loading into road trains the resulting heavy mineral concentrate (HMC) 
will be hauled approximately 40km to a transfer pumping station via a dedicated haul road 
and pumped, via a 14km slurry pipeline, to a mineral separation plant (MSP) located at the 
existing port of Toliara, from which it is shipped by sea (Bezuidenhout 2013).  
 
Even though dry mining may seem less environmentally impactful than dredge mining, the 
impacts, like the process, are qualitatively different yet significant. According to the ESIA, the 
entire mining area, which is about 16km long and 1–2km wide, will be cleared of all 
vegetation, and topsoil will be stripped and stored for later environmental rehabilitation. 
Backfilling of the actively mined areas with sand tailings (concentrated waste materials left 
over after valuable material has been removed from the ore) from the PCP and MSP will 
occur continuously as the mining progresses. It is important to note that, due to the natural 
occurrence of uranium and thorium in the area, the tailings will be potentially hazardous to 
humans and other organisms due to significantly higher levels of radiation contained in the 
concentrated tailings when compared to the natural background radiation levels of the 
original sand. Both the mine operations and the use of the new haul road connecting the 
mine site to the port are projected to result in high wildlife mortality risk and threats to 
biodiversity as a result of pollution, fire, and other causes (Bezuidenhout 2013). 
 
The rehabilitation and mitigation plan is not set in stone at this early date, but proposed 
options are described in the ESIA as well. Clear-cutting and mining activities will be followed 
by rehabilitation of the backfilled areas through replacing topsoil and replanting with 
trees/woodlots and crops over time. Over the course of the mine life, operators propose to 
develop both carbon and biodiversity offset strategies, the former through accounting for 
trees planted through rehabilitative and mitigating activities, and the latter with input and 
support from local agencies, most likely to be carried out through financial contributions to 
the management of nearby protected areas (Bezuidenhout 2013).  
 
The Ranobe mine is a highly contentious development, not only constituting competition for 
land with local stakeholders but also a threat to rare forested ecosystems, which has led to 
long-standing conflicts with conservation researchers and environmentalists (Waeber et al. 
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2015). According to the 2013 social impact assessment, the mine operators are cognizant of 
the fact that mining activities will be severely disruptive to the livelihoods and wellbeing of 
people living in the project area. In an attempt to be proactive, the company has planned or 
carried out consultation and social outreach activities including the restoration of wells and 
installation of foot pumps in three villages, paying for four visits by Australian doctors to 
Toliara, donating furniture to local schools and improving ‘sport facilities’. A grievance 
reporting mechanism was also being designed as of 2015 (WTR 2015; Reilly 2013; 
Bezuidenhout 2013). However, these activities have not been sufficient to counter a number 
of serious grievances and ongoing concerns on the part of residents of the mining area that 
have been documented by Malagasy researchers and a growing network of community 
advocates and activists.  
 
According to Professor Robert Tsiazonera9 (pers. comm. 2016), at the outset of negotiations 
many Malagasy people felt that the Toliara Sands represented an important opportunity for 
regional development in terms of improved infrastructure and employment. This initial 
optimism facilitated the establishment of the company in the region, but soon faded as 
people near Ranobe and the other exploration sites became disillusioned with the operation, 
feeling that Toliara Sands was a ‘cursed’ (maudit) enterprise that could not financially 
support its commitments and that its representatives were not responsive to local grievances 
and reneged on agreements made with representatives of local communities. Some locals 
have expressed the opinion that operators ‘tricked’ villagers who live in the vicinity of the 
Ranobe site in order to receive the mining permit and lease surface rights, which has led to 
strong protests on the basis of the strong perception that the Toliara Sands project is 
mavandy (full of lies).  
 
Local grievances have been made on a number of grounds. Professor Jaovola Tombo, who 
has conducted interviews with mayors and village heads in affected areas as well as with 
Malagasy affiliates of the mining operation, points to three major categories of problems that 
give rise to social conflict around the Ranobe mine and other exploration sites. The first is 
the effects of mine activities on the basis of rural livelihoods that include community forestry, 
hunting and gathering, farming, livestock grazing and marketing. Second, the mining area 
(the location of the good ‘black sands’, or fasymainty) is in fact an important cultural 
landscape, including tombs of local residents of different ethnic groups. Third, there has 
been resistance and outright opposition to the operation by several powerful clans (extended 
family groups based on descent) and village mayors in the region on the basis that promised 
compensation has not been made as agreed (Tombo, pers. comm. 2016). 
 
A number of ancestral tombs belonging to local Masikoro and Antandroy people exist within 
the mining area. In southwestern Madagascar, ancestral tombs have unique cultural and 
practical salience. For example, tombs are cultural and historical ‘anchors’ for living people, 
representing ritual and cosmological connections between living people and their forebears. 
Tombs are also an important means of staking both customary and formal claims to territory 
for local people. In this region, removal or relocation of tombs is extremely problematic to 
say the least, particularly if initiated by foreigners. While some compensation to families 
whose tombs have been marked for removal was promised, a good portion of these funds 
was allegedly paid to consultants rather than affected families, and other families outright 
refused tomb removal. Masikoro require extreme circumstances and formal ceremonies to 
allow tomb relocation and for Antandroy tomb removal or relocation is forbidden. World 
Titanium Resources is intent on removing the tombs from the site despite local protests and 
                                                        
9 Professor Robert Tsiazonera, a historian, and Professor Jaovola Tombo, a human geographer, both based at the University 
of Toliara, are leading Malagasy researchers with expertise on ethnohistory, livelihoods, development and conservation history 
and community conflicts in southwestern Madagascar. They are among a very few researchers who have been engaged in 
documenting local responses to, and social and environmental impacts of, the Ranobe mine and broader Toliara Sands 
operations.  
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the fact that these tombs are sacred to the descendants of the people who are interred in 
them (Tsiazonera, pers. comm. 2016; Tombo, pers. comm. 2016). 
 
Aside from the issue of tomb removal, the social conflicts emerging around the Ranobe mine 
are very complex. To give another example, this is particularly true in regard to the 
recruitment of employees. The Malagasy Mining Code requires operators to employ 
Malagasy workers for jobs of appropriate skill levels. In the beginning, most Malagasy 
recruited for employment with the mine were from the national capital of Antananarivo (the 
location of Toliara Sands headquarters), which did not sit well at all with people from the 
Toliara region, as this was a move akin to hiring foreign workers when mine operations are 
causing displacement of livelihoods for people on a local level. Senior villagers who live 
around the operating site demand that their children, many of whom lack alternative 
livelihood or formal employment options in an absolute sense, be considered for 
employment by World Titanium Resources (WTR). This and other factors have contributed 
to factionalisation and conflicts within villages between people who favour and oppose 
mining operations. There are allegations that representatives of the Toliara Sands project 
have actually paid some villagers in cash or goods to locally advocate for the company 
against the peasants who say that the mining activities are a danger to their way of life and 
existence (Tsiazonera, pers. comm. 2016).  
 
The Ranobe mine is located in one of the most ecologically diverse parts of the country, in a 
dry, sub-arid ecological transition zone between dry deciduous forest and spiny thickets, 
which comprises a patchwork of PAs managed under a variety of governance arrangements. 
For example, the mining concession is just north of the northern boundary of the Ranobe 
protected area (called variously the Fiherenana–Manombo Complex, the Southern 
Mikea/Mikea Sud, Toliara Forest, Ala Maiky and PK32–Ranobe), which has long been 
recognised as a conservation priority area and is co-managed between several NGOs and 
local communities under SAPM. It is also situated just southeast of the buffer zone of the 
restrictive Mikea Forest National Park administered by Madagascar National Parks (formerly 
ANGAP) (Blanc-Pamard 2009; Gardner et al. 2009; Huff 2012, 2014; WWF 2015). The 
mine’s proximity to conservation priority areas has been a source of conflict with 
environmental researchers and activists for several years prior to the establishment of these 
PAs. This is because, throughout the 2000s, the proposed extent of these two PAs was 
reduced by thousands of hectares and boundaries redrawn several times in order to 
accommodate the Ranobe, Ankililoaka, Basibasy and Morombe mining concessions, which 
delayed PA establishment by several years.  
 
A number of artists from the region, including popular musicians Théo-Rakotovao (stage 
name Mikea), Bacom and Jarifa, have also reacted publicly against the Toliara Sands 
development. Rakotovao has been part of the establishment of a local advocacy group 
called the Society for the Defence of Life, Human Rights and the Environment (Défense de 
la Vie, des Droits Humains et de l’Environnement, or Miaro ny Aina sy Zon’olombelona ary 
Tontolo iainana – MA.ZO.TO.) and even released an album titled Hazolava in an effort to 
alert national and international audiences to the negative social and environmental impacts 
of the project. MA.ZO.TO. and other activist groups, including the Collectif pour la Defense 
des Terres Malgaches (TANY) have contributed to national and international efforts to stop 
the project on the basis of its negative impacts.   
 
As of early 2016, Toliara Sands exploration and mining operations, including those at the 
Ranobe site, have been temporarily suspended due to mine site conflicts and pending 
reforms to the national mining code. 
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7 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
With the surge in large-scale mining operations throughout Africa in contexts where 
population needs are considerable and development efforts limited, the policy environment 
necessitates the mitigation of a variety of conflicts and risks at mine site level (Perks 2012). 
In response to a range of environmental and human rights incidents involving mining 
companies across various African countries, regulations as well as voluntary codes, often 
under the banner of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), have been developed to prevent 
or minimise conflict and risk (Perks 2012: 253). But in order to ensure that extractive 
industries sufficiently address social and environmental issues, governments must have the 
capacity to perform monitoring roles as well as possess the political will to perform them 
(Perks 2012).  
 
National officials are trying to solve these problems through policy reform, but government 
efforts so far have been primarily symbolic and have done nothing to reduce the tensions 
that exist at the level of the mine site. Due to a lack of clarity and enforcement mechanisms 
in the existing land laws and Mining Code, and the fact that large investors are essentially 
self-regulators responsible for ensuring that environmental regulations and land laws are 
respected at the level of the mine site, environmental concerns and the legal rights and 
substantive interests of local populations are often subordinated to the primary goals of 
extractive operations, leading to increased risk of conflicts on a number of levels. As the 
Malagasy government tackles another round of Mining Code reforms for intended 
implementation in 2016, partially in response to the proliferation of conflicts around mining 
investments, this report and the cases described within it highlight important problems and 
gaps in current policy that should be addressed by national-level policymakers and their 
international partners.  
7.1 Legal pluralism, policy confusion and government capacity 
Because of the legal pluralism that pervades the domain of foreign investment in 
Madagascar, individual mining operations are governed by a complex regulatory patchwork 
that lacks consistent oversight and enforcement mechanisms. This leads to situations 
characterised by confusion and uncertainty, exacerbated by attempts to operationalise 
contradictory policies or directives, corruption and a poor understanding of policies on the 
part of even ministerial and agency employees. In extreme cases, this can lead to disputes 
between different ministries and agencies or between government representatives, mining 
companies and local community members, and also to situations in which particular areas of 
land are put to apparently conflicting uses. 
 
Localised conflicts are related to dynamic factors, including unsatisfied expectations for 
human development on the part of people living near or at the mine site, unemployment or 
unfair employment practices, and the transformative effects of large mining operations on 
formal and informal economies, as well as complex relations around mining activities that 
are internal to different groups of stakeholders (Gingembre 2015; Perks 2012). Across 
salient sectors, improving cooperation across ministries and agencies, reducing corruption 
and enhancing the government’s political will and capacity for monitoring and enforcement of 
just and internally consistent policies would be a huge step toward reducing risk of conflicts. 
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7.2 Can Madagascar reconcile environmental goals, foreign 
investment and poverty reduction by facilitating large-scale 
mining investments? 
As it currently stands, the answer to the above question is no. Between the 1980s and the 
late 2000s, Madagascar’s primary efforts at international ‘branding’ undeniably centred on 
biodiversity. At the same time that Madagascar was attracting donor support for the 
expansion of its environmental protection capacity and environmental mainstreaming, the 
land, mining and investment codes were being rewritten to draw large-scale international 
investment in agriculture and especially mining. Following this, in recent years, there has 
been increased emphasis on advertising Madagascar’s mineral and hydrocarbon assets as 
an untapped opportunity for foreign investors seeking ‘hidden treasures’ in an island ‘El 
Dorado’ (EDBM 2016). 
 
It is true that reforms have indeed made Madagascar’s mining sector a more appealing 
option for foreign investors and mining’s share of the national economy has grown. 
However, state restructuring and reforms across mining, land and environmental sectors 
also come with inherent contradictions, and at a high cost for governance capabilities and, 
most significantly, for local populations and ecologies. In the context created through 
structural adjustment, the government of Madagascar’s superficial bureaucracy has 
expanded, sectors have become increasingly siloed and the regulatory capacity of the state 
has been undermined. Furthermore, in the country’s financial situation, ministerial and 
agency employees literally cannot afford to reject large mining investments even when they 
conflict with environmental goals or will cause outright harm to rare ecosystems. When 
mining investments and environmental preservation come into conflict, as has occurred in 
both cases presented in this report, it is clear that mining wins out.  
 
In the context of Mining Code reform (which will surely continue after 2016), efforts toward 
resolving this contradiction should be prioritised. Donors should encourage the 
establishment of third-party mechanisms to evaluate ESIAs prior to awarding mineral rights 
to operations, with emphasis on avoiding or reducing initial harm of extractive activities to 
ecosystemic functions rather than the current model that places emphasis on mitigation 
through (often vague) offsetting and rehabilitation plans that will only be implemented years 
or decades into the future.  
7.3 Land tenure security and trust in institutions are crucial to 
avoiding conflict and achieving justice 
Members of local communities with the most to lose often bear the highest costs of the 
establishment of both protected areas and extractive development, having insufficient 
access to information and legal protection from exploitative arrangements. Furthermore, 
programmes that involve shifts in land control from local users to the state, private 
companies or other extra-local entities are highly controversial among Malagasy people. 
While some authors attribute this to Malagasy culture and traditional associations of land 
and ancestors, others point out that there are significant justice issues associated with 
granting land access to investors. The category of state-owned land, particularly when it 
comes to forestland and the designation of pasturelands as ‘unoccupied’ and open to state 
ownership claims, is often highly contested by local users. The acquisitions process is also 
an object of criticism. Graft is a common occurrence in the application process, and 
consultations with local resource users run the risk of appearing to be an afterthought or 
symbolic gesture. As a result, on a local level, long experience with a distant-yet-threatening 
state, corrupt government employees, unscrupulous private sector operators and unfulfilled 
promises for local development and benefits sharing have fuelled the widespread 
perceptions that extra-local actors interested in local land cannot be trusted and that local 
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villagers have no power to formally refuse fencing or land deals. On a social and policy level, 
historical experience, state restructuring and land tenure security appear to lie at the centre 
of the mining–environmental protection–conflict nexus in Madagascar.  
 
A study by Jacoby and Minten (2007) for the World Bank found, contrary to stated local-level 
development goals of national land reform, that the economic impact of land reform has 
been minimal in Madagascar. They found that land registration does not significantly affect 
rural landholders’ access to credit, rates of investment, crop yields or the establishment of 
local land markets (Minten and Barrett 2007). Furthermore, while land reform has attempted 
to reconcile the contradictions between customary and national systems and simplify 
procedures for obtaining land certificates, land conflicts remain common and tenure 
insecurity persists. Tenure security varies depending on the characteristics of customary 
systems and, despite attempts to reconcile them, due to conflicts between the customary 
systems and formal land laws. Furthermore, while most land rights held under customary 
tenure are clearly defined and understood, people can face difficulties securing land due to a 
lack of access to legal information (USAID 2010: 6). The availability of legal information and 
bureaucratic literacy can help people overcome social, bureaucratic and cost barriers to 
accessing land certificates, but problems with transparency exacerbate barriers, especially 
for the poor. Certification can offer a solution to some local land conflicts, but the effects of 
land reform on tenure security depend on land users’ perceptions of the legitimacy, reliability 
and accessibility of new institutions, which are shaped greatly by their observation of 
technical and sociopolitical practice at the local level (Burnod et al. 2012).  
7.4 Consultation protocols and gaining access to local lands for 
development 
Procedures for obtaining land access from local individuals or groups for conservation, 
mining, or agricultural development need increased transparency and strong mechanisms to 
ensure not only that local-level users and owners of land are consulted and consent to land 
deals, but also that stakeholders at the local level have the power to reject deals, to legally 
demand fair compensation for loss of livelihoods and access to state-owned lands, to 
actively shape land deals and to negotiate for fair benefits-sharing schemes. Under current 
practice, when consultation with local stakeholders does take place, there are often 
questions as to the true representativeness of the locals selected to attend meetings, and to 
the actual level of consultation that takes place (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011).  
 
The bargaining power of villagers is hindered by poor access to economic and institutional 
alternatives, long mistrust of the state exacerbated by media publicisation of ‘secret’ large-
scale land deals, and the entrenched idea that all untitled land is state-owned (Burnod, 
Gingembre and Andrianirina Ratsialonana 2013; Ferguson et al. 2014; Gingembre 2015). 
Further, because of the centralisation of the investments facilitation process and the SOLA, 
in cases of organised local opposition to a deal there is a high likelihood that the dispute will 
be resolved at the level of state services without the participation of local populations, and 
under strong political pressure in support of investors (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 
2011). According to Gingembre, consultations often turn into ‘rubberstamping procedures 
instead of spaces of participatory decision-making’ (2015: 562); this is because Madagascar 
lacks effective mechanisms for local land users to reject or substantively contribute to 
shaping land deals.  
7.5 Anticipating and resolving conflicts  
In the context of extractive development, conflict can lead to violence, but can also result in 
tensions, ideological insurgencies, new social movements and other forms of antagonism 
and resistance that arise on different jurisdictional levels, cross scales, and which involve 
diverse actors, organisations and governance structures (Huff 2015). In this sense, in the 
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absence of escalation and harm, conflict is not always necessarily a bad thing, as the 
examination of emerging conflicts can highlight unanticipated and emerging issues, 
grievances and trends that are of broad significance to policy and to the wellbeing of 
stakeholders. In addition to enhancing the recognition of the rights of local stakeholders in 
the context of development, developing guidance on means of assessing unanticipated 
conflicts, trade-offs and synergies as they arise in the context of large-scale investment is 
crucial, as is the institution of mechanisms for initiating participatory and transparent 
processes of conflict resolution prior to escalation. Indeed, processes of conflict resolution 
can be important to achieving and enhancing justice and development outcomes in 
situations characterised by asymmetrical economic and power relations and legacies of 
mistrust and exploitation.  
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